Safety design strategies in highly autonomous drive level 2 - Lateral control decomposition concept by Štolfa, Svatopluk et al.
 Journal of Universal Computer Science, vol. 27, no. 8 (2021), 811-829 
submitted: 8/4/2021, accepted: 2/5/2021, appeared: 28/8/2021 CC BY-ND 4.0 
Safety Design Strategies in Highly Autonomous Drive 








(VSB – Technical University of Ostrava, Ostrava, Czech Republic, 
 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0599-6209, jakub.stolfa@vsb.cz) 
 
Petr Simonik 












Abstract: The paper is based on an experimental study at VSB TUO Ostrava with a DEMOCAR 
vehicle that simulates a real car with sensor fusion concept and a vehicle gateway to send and 
coordinate commands to ECUs to realize and manage autonomous driving. In this experimental 
study of autonomous driving vehicles control, a HARA (Hazard and Risk Analysis, ISO 
26262:2018) has been done on vehicle level and strategies have been defined and implemented 
to manage safety situations where the car lateral control shall be hand over to a driver when in 
HAD 2 mode. The issue is that the switching to safe state shall not be done immediately but the 
vehicle has to stay in safe driving mode – fail-operational up to 4 seconds until a driver can take 
over. The UECE and other relevant studies show that it can take up to 6 seconds if driver/operator 
is not in the flow (HAD 3) and up to the 2 seconds when driver is in the flow (HAD 1). The paper 
makes assumptions and proposals about vehicle lateral control strategy to ensure the smooth take-
over of the car by driver and its impact on control software development architectures. 
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1 Introduction  
Nowadays with rapid technological progress, the automotive sector [Stolfa 2020] 
[Stolfa 2020 b] and car development tackle many challenges. One of them is to assure 
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appropriate fail-safe operation of the systems for the vehicles with the higher 
autonomous levels. 
Car makers define vehicle functions [KGAS 2018] [Messnarz 2017 b] and each 
vehicle function is assigned to number of ECUs (Electronic Control Units with 
actuators) who are executing ECU functions based on a real time communication flow. 
The communication between the ECUs is supported by a vehicle bus. 
The SQIL (Software Quality Improvement Lead) training at VW therefore e.g., 
defines a FUN principle, which stands for function-based vehicle development 
[Messnarz 2017].  
The traceability of those vehicle functions to ECU functions and components inside 
the ECU are checked by Automotive SPICE assessments and the traceability includes 
functional, non-functional, safety and cybersecurity requirements and functionality 
[Ekert 2020] [Höhn 2016] [Kreiner 2013] [Kreiner 2014] [Kreiner 2015] [Messnarz 
2019 b] [Steger 2020]. These assessments check such functional designs, effect chains 
and dynamic views. In ISO 26262 e.g., the safety critical signal flow is assessed 
[Macher 2017], [Macher 2017 b], in Automotive SPICE this is called dynamic view, 
and in cybersecurity norms [Macher 2017 b], [Messnarz 2020], [Riel 2018], [SAE 
2016] this is also called a threat model with cybersecurity critical data, interfaces and 
functions.  
Functional safety defines the terms fail-safe and fail-operational [Messnarz 2019]. 
Fail-operational. Fail-operational systems continue to operate when their control 
systems fail. 
Fail safe. Fail-safe systems become safe when they cannot operate. Fail safe means 
that the car reaches a state that can be controlled by the driver, it is expected that the 
driver is in the flow. E.g., switching the gear box to neutral, switching the turn 
indicators off and warn the driver, switching the steering motor off and avoid self-
steering, etc. [Messnarz 2019] 
HAD (Highly Autonomous Drive) cars do not assume that the driver is actively 
controlling the car during autonomous drive but stays in the flow up to HAD 3. For 
HAD 1 the UNECE defines that the system must allow a 2 second period for take-over, 
for HAD 2 4 seconds, and for HAD 3 6 seconds to reach a safe state controlled by the 
driver. 
Highly autonomous drive systems are built towards fail-operational systems which 
means that only 3 to 4 time faults lead to a failure so we have a fallback mode. However, 
building such a fail-operational system leads to an extensive backup-oriented 
architecture solution where systems are sometimes practically doubled. The outcome 
of such architecture solutions is fail-operational system, but the cost of the complete 
solution that consist of many of such “doubled” systems makes it hardly possible to be 
applied in standard series vehicles. The cost of the vehicle would increase so high that 
it will not be any more desired high number series vehicle, but few luxury pieces limited 
series of cars for those who can afford them. Therefore, one way how to overcome this 
problem might be to try to look for a possible solution that would fulfill fail-operational 
requirements but would be effective in the light of effort and product cost [Messnarz 
2019]. 
From the function point of view, HAD vehicle maneuvering functions can be 
divided to longitudinal and lateral control. Longitudinal maneuvering is understood as 
acceleration and deceleration, lateral maneuvering as steering. In fact, such desired 
functions are not realized just by one specific system but done then by complex 
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combination of vehicle systems cooperation (e.g., in case of steering - steering unit, 
ESP - Electronic Stability Program, ABS - anti-lock braking system, damper system 
etc.). 
In this paper, we are focusing on the flow of the signals and behavior of the whole 
vehicle, coming from the trusted sensor box to the vehicle systems and its 
interpretation. We are proposing and analyzing assumptions and possible solutions that 
must be followed to achieve the desired 4 seconds fail-operational lateral control. The 
research question: Is there a possibility to build on the current fail-safe systems and 
“just” slightly enhance them to be a fail-operational in cost-effective way? Therefore, 
to do not significantly increase a complexity of the system by the approach of doubling 
each critical control system to be fail-operational but try to use other possible concepts 
to solve the desired 4 seconds fail-operational requirement in case of HAD 2 [UNECE 
2020] [UNECE 2020 b].  
Idea is, to have a fail-operational decomposition “backup” of steering system by 
another system – ESP and therefore lower the price of the whole solution, because such 
a system has to be already present in the car. 
Chapter 2 describes the current state of the art example of fail-operational steering 
system, gateway system solution for the HAD car, and DEMOCAR architecture and 
capabilities. Chapter 3 describes proposed solution for steering functional 
decomposition - HARA. Chapter 4 experiments performed on DEMOCAR platform. 
Chapter 5 concludes and outlooks the future possible “lean” design solutions. 
2 State of the Art 
2.1. Typical Fail-operational Steering System 
Current steering systems are rated ASIL D (Automotive Safety Integrity Level [ISO 
26262 2011]), has a torque bar sensor in the steering rack, measures the torque and uses 
ECU and e-motor to support the steering movement by a connection of the motor, a 
mechanical gear, and the steering pinion. The safe state is motor off. The hazards 
typically include self-steering, blocking of steering, etc. [Messnarz 2009] [Messnarz 
2016] [Messnarz 2019]. 
Future HAD vehicles will have no steering wheel and no steering column and no 
torque bar sensor, because there will be no driver interaction. 
Fig. 1 depicts the decomposition of “typical” fail-operational steering system 
[Messnarz 2019]. We have 2 ASILD D steering ECUs and whole redundant steering 
system concept assuring that in case of hazardous fault of the primary part, the system 
can still steer safety by switching to the redundant safe system. 
 
• Power supply is redundant for the ECUs and motor of the steering rack. 
• ASIL D controlled 6 phase motors are redundant. While premium models in 
Germany use 2 times 6 phase motor, in USA it is more common to use 2 times 
3 phase motor. 
• If one ECU fails, the other takes on.  
• Still if on the ECU one 3-phase motor fails, the other 3-phases can still be 
actuated. 
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• All this easily allows to win more than 6 seconds to allow the driver to take 
control and also the above concept requires a 4 times fault before the hazard 
would strike. 
 
Such a 4 times parallel electronic concept is in fact already a preparation for a 
HAD> 3 vehicle. In this paper we discuss that for HAD <= 3 a less complex architecture 
could be used. 
 
.  
Figure 1: Example of typical fail-operational steering system 
 
2.2. Gateway System Solution – Lateral and Longitudinal Control of the Vehicle 
on Typical VW Group Car Platform 
Fig. 2 shows the item picture of a developed special gateway system (dev-DCU) which 
is integrated to the actual VW Group car platform. Picture displays main components 
and communication flow between standard E/E architecture of the experimental car 
(lowest layer), gateway system named “dev-DCU” (middle layer) and Control-PC as 
Central Computing System (top layer). The gateway transfers information and 
commands, which are necessary for lateral and longitudinal control, between the lowest 
and top layer. Car ECUs from lowest layer report their status back through the gateway 
to the top layer. To realize a specific car function a number of ECUs must be actuated 
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Figure 2: Item picture of vehicle level control system for ADAS development and 
testing 
E.g., in case of required steering action the steering ECU (EPS - Electronic Power 
Steering) controls the steering angle and actual steering angle is the EPS feedback used 
for real time control by Control-PC (as drive-by-wire control through testing operator) 
or Central Computing System (as kind of autonomous driving control system realized 
driving test scenario). Gateway functions as a translator of ECU sensors data and data 
fusion results, in other steps forms input data to a specific processing of commands to 
be sent. Gateway is not responsible for the control of actuators (this is the ECUs task 
and tasks of top layer control and testing scenario strategy). The main task is to send 
commands in correct order, sequence, timing and seek whether an error state is reported 
back by one of the ECUs. In case of required longitudinal control, the powertrain 
coordinator (on the base of required acceleration) is responsible to control driving 
(engine ECU) and braking torque (ESP ECU). Automatic transmission is controlled by 
required gear shift command from top layer or just by automatic transmission itself in 
the case of autonomous mode. 
Monitoring of selected system variables (internal variables of dev-DCU), current 
values of data signals, states of the state machine and more is possible through an 
additional HMI. The development vehicle must be equipped with a STOP button and a 
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SW / HW solution, ensuring factory settings in the event of a critical / collision 
situation. 
This modified platform enables the development and testing of new ADAS (Advanced 
Driver-Assistance Systems). All functionalities must respect the original architecture 
of the car's electronic systems and the plurality of the platform based on the original 
data matrix setting out the rules and principles of communication, cooperation, and 
control processes. However, used classical platform has limitations for experiments and 
therefore we are also using own variable platform on Democar II. This own highly 
universal platform is using programmable control units, where there are no limits for 
torque and brake control of each wheel. We can test “enhancements” to the classical 
platforms by using the Democar II platform or just “simulating” conventional 
platforms. 
 
2.3. DEMOCAR Architecture and Capabilities 
Experimental vehicle, Democar II 4WD, contains drive/steer/brake-by-wire with 
independent control of the driving and braking torque of each wheel. 
 
Democar II (see Fig. 3 and 5) is specifically adapted as an automated guided vehicle 
(AGV). This second stage has separate electronic systems:  
• 4x4 electric drive (designed as hub e-drives; 4x BLDC motors),  
• system of independent electrohydraulic brakes of each wheel,  
• power steering system with power steering (steer-by-wire, manufactured 
by DC electronics),  
• central electronics system as an interface of a sensor system or remote 
control,  
• a power and charging management system (1x unbalanced on-board 
battery, 1x balanced traction battery),  
• a system for remote data transmission in an industrial LTE / 5G Campus 
Network,  
• an electronic lighting system  
• and more.  
 
The systems communicate via data buses according to automotive standards. 
Within the E/E architecture, Pi Innovo programmable control units (Open ECUs) are 
used to expand the possibilities of using the vehicle platform for research purposes. Pi 
Innovo Open ECUs enable development within the so-called Model Based R&D. Fig. 
3 shows the topology of interconnection of control systems for data communication of 
the Democar II vehicle, which was developed with respect to the requirements for 
integration of modular and communication principle according to modularity 2030+. 
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There are 3 ways to brake. Countercurrent braking, kinetic energy recuperation braking, 
hydraulic braking (as brake-by-wire) with independent braking force control for each 
wheel and emergency and parking brake system with electromechanical brake 
integrated in the brake calipers. The emergency and parking brake system is connected 
to a redundant separate power supply network with its own power supply (battery). This 
power supply network provides power to this system in the event of a failure of the 
main power supply network of electronic vehicle systems. Depending on the required 
braking intensity, which is interpreted in the actual deceleration of the vehicle, the 
vehicle braking strategy is implemented (one or more braking systems are activated 
within the algorithm) through the CCU (Central Control-Unit). The hydraulic circuits 
are controlled using the OpenECU M220, which are designed to control solenoids 
(inductive nature of the load), which are part of the solenoid control of the hydraulic 
valve of the brake system. The electromechanical brake system is supplemented by a 
control part with an MCU (Microprocessor Control Unit) system with Teensy 4.1 
(ARM Cortex-M7), which in addition to brake pressure control provides a number of 
safety algorithms for hardware monitoring. 
Four independent hub BLDC motors (motor in hub) with SEVCON GEN4 
inverters (size 2) are controlled by the CCU via data communication via the CAN bus. 
Figure 3: High level DEMOCAR architecture (E/E architecture 2030+; 
domain computing, central computer, cloud computing) 
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Control algorithms are applied with several strategies based on instantaneous states of 
traction conditions. Together with the drive torque control, the control uses signal 
rationality control, which is based on running a virtual kinematic model in the CCU 
and compares the required and actual data. 
Details of experiments with assistance system for lateral control which was 
performed on Democar II platform is described in section 4. 
3 Methodology and Structure – HARA Assumptions 
3.1 Experiences with Hazard and Risk Analysis in HAD Design 
Hazard and risk analysis (HARA) and ASIL determination purpose is to determine the 
safety goals for the item to be able to prevent or mitigate the potential hazardous events 
caused by the item malfunction. Further elaboration of the safety goals then shall lead 
among others to the implementation of fault tolerance mechanisms that maintains the 
item in a safe state (with or without degradation) [ISO 26262 2011] [ISO 26262 2018] 
[Messnarz 2009] [Messnarz 2016] [Messnarz 2017 b]. 
HARA is item specific; we have performed the analysis on the vehicle level for the 
“classic” platform vehicle on the market with the intent to identify fail-safe goals of 
such a classic platform and compare them to the fail-operational safety goals needed 
for HAD 2-3 design. Our HARA example is limited to the steering function. When 
doing a HARA at vehicle level for a HAD2-3 design steering project we were following 
best practice and applying the following three steps: 
 
Step 1: Identify all possible driving scenarios for defined vehicle function. It means 
to perform a situation analysis and prepare relevant scenarios descriptions for the 
considered vehicle function.  
Tab. 1 shows the examples of situations in combination with the possible 
accident scenario/effect that. e.g., driving forward, high speed, country road or 
highway as representatives of worst case situations for considerations about steering 
function malfunction. Malfunction in such situations might lead to the vehicle front 
collision with an obstacle/road construction or other vehicle. 
 
Step 2: Consider these driving situations in HARA, identify possible 
malfunctions/hazards, and rate the failure situations and receive an ASIL rating. 
Regarding the steering function, we have identified four possible general 
malfunctions that can lead to, in certain driving scenarios, a potential accident: too 
much steering, no steering, less steering, sudden steering. 
 
Situation Accident scenario/effect 
Driving forward, high speed, 
country road 
Vehicle front collision - obstacle/road 
construction-other vehicle 
Driving forward, high speed, 
highway 
Vehicle front collision - obstacle/road 
construction-other vehicle 
Driving forward, medium 
speed, country road 
Vehicle front collision - obstacle/road 
construction-other vehicle 
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Driving forward, medium 
speed, highway 
Vehicle front collision - obstacle/road 
construction-other vehicle 
Driving forward, medium 
speed, city road, pedestrians 
present 
Vehicle front collision with pedestrian 
Table 1: Simplified examples of driving scenarios to be considered for steering 




scenario/effect S E C ASIL 
no steering - no vehicle 













3 4 3 D 
less steering - 
insufficient lateral 












3 4 3 D 
too much steering - to 














other vehicle side 
collision 
3 4 3 D 















other vehicle side 
collision 
3 4 3 D 
Table 2: Example extract from HARA rating 
Tab. 2 presents the example of ASIL assignment for four different possible identified 
steering function malfunctions. Among others, in all described situations in Tab. 2 the 
malfunction can lead to serious hazards rated ASIL D, because of arguments 
combination - life-threatening injuries (S3), steering is needed more than 10% of 
average operating time (E4) and unexpected steering is uncontrollable according to the 
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ISO 26262 norm and other state of the art publications (C3) [ISO 26262 2011] [ISO 
26262 2018] [Messnarz 2009] [Messnarz 2016] [Messnarz 2017 b]. 
 
Step 3: Define safety goals and write down and agree assumptions which need to 






















































to 4 sec 

































to 4 sec 
too much 





































































to 4 sec 
Table 3: HARA rating with safety goal – fail-safe system vs. fail-operational 
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Tab 3 shows the assignment of safety goals for identified situational hazards and 
assigned safety goals. Let us consider the classic platform up to HAD-1 first. There 
were 3 safety goals identified for the example situations: 
• SG 1: System shall prevent loss of vehicle lateral motion control,  
• SG 2: System shall prevent insufficient vehicle lateral motion control,  
• SG 3: System shall prevent unintended steering support.  
The assumption is that driver stays in the flow and shall be able to react to driving 
situations and take-over the steering when needed. Therefore, to be able to mitigate the 
hazardous events we are able to define the safe state that takes into account such 
assumption – steering motor off. 
When considering HAD 2-3 levels steering function, we have to consider that the 
driver, even if he is supposed to do so, pays less attention to the traffic and driving 
situations itself. In case of HAD 2, driver shall continue to remain in control of the 
vehicle. However, studies and experience reports show that it takes 2-6 seconds for a 
driver to react, depending on the HAD level, even if in HAD 1-2 driver is supposed to 
have hands on steering wheel and observing the traffic and behavior and in HAD 3 to 
have hands close to the steering wheel. [Armengaud 2019] [Wright 2016] [Zhang 
2019][UNECE 2020][UNEE 2020 b]. Since the main goal of this paper is to analyze 
the possible concepts of HAD 2 steering solutions, let us define (among others) the 
following safety goal: 
SG 1: System shall keep lateral motion control up to 4 sec. 
System has to assure that in case of failure, lateral control will remain fail-
operational up to 4 seconds. The driver has a time then to take-over vehicle steering 
control within 4 seconds and car has to remain stable until the driver will be able to 
take-over. 
4 Experiments Performed on DEMOCAR Platform 
4. 1 Experiences with Hazard and Risk Analysis in HAD Design  
In the previous section, we have described HARA approach and determination of safety 
goals for HAD2 steering support purposes. The next step then is to define safety 
concept for desired fail-operational state that shall be maintained by the system up to 4 
sec. Typical solution would be fail-operational steering system as depicted in section 
2.1. In line with our research question: ̀ Is there a possibility to build on the current fail-
safe systems, like e.g. MQB platform from Volkswagen and “just” slightly enhance 
them to be a fail-operational in cost-effective way`, we have tried to think about and 
propose solutions that would be built on the classic platform with cost effective 
enhancements and still fulfill the safety goal. 
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Figure 4: ADAS function decomposition on vehicle level 
 
Fig. 4 shows the functional decomposition of the steering among the steering system 
(EPS – Electronics Power Steering) itself and instead of doubling the steering system 
the proposal is that the steering function will be “backed-up” by another ASIL-D 
system already present in the classic vehicle platform - the ESP (Electronic Stability 
Program system). First, it has to be proven, that in case of steering motor off the ESP 
system is able to perform lateral control of the vehicle itself. Second, all possible design 
solutions and possible issues have to be argued.  
When comparing the typical double steering solution to our proposal, some issues 
could be already identified. One of the possible issues that came to our mind is the 
power supply solution on classic platforms. If power supply fails, then both systems 
fail at once and this common cause fault cannot be avoided on current platforms. 
Argument to the power supply issue is that this is state of the art for the combustion 
engine cars so far. We are also aware of and experimenting with possible solutions to 
this power supply issue as well, but this experiments and proposals for starting battery 
solutions and integrated backups goes beyond the scope of this paper [Messnarz 2019].  
Also, there is another technical requirement that has to be considered as a possible 
addition to the classic platform functionality. It is assumed that the ESP will have no 
limits for torque and brake control of each wheel, which is not the case of the classic 
platform solution. It is present in sport cars alternatives. 
The next sub-section describes and discusses the performed experiment on the 
Democar platform that tested the functional decomposition and the possibility of the 
technical solution itself in order to answer the question whether it is able to maintain 
the intended path up and perform lateral control without EPS up to 4 seconds. 
 
4.2 Experimental Proof on DEMOCAR Platform 
Using the Democar II, an experimental EPS / power steering failure test was performed. 
EPS is constructed as rack-and-pinion power steering with steer-by-wire function. In 
case of steering failure "the lateral steering assistance system" is activated using the 
braking torque control of the individual front wheels. The power steering failure is 
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represented by a sudden switch-off of the EPS and steering wheel angle control (failure 
in the initial position of the steering wheel angle of 0 degrees). 
 
The scenario for testing the lateral steering assistance system is designed for the 
driving situation of embracing an obstacle in the state of a malfunctioning power 
steering. The vehicle starts with zero steering wheel angle and is accelerated by a 
positive value of the required acceleration in the longitudinal direction. Subsequently, 
the power steering failure (EPS) is simulated and then the vehicle is controlled in the 
lateral steering through alternating braking of the individual wheels. This is the control 
of the direction of rotation by shear. 
 
Figure 6: Graphical description of real testing scenario on the road with Democar II 
To embrace the obstacle on the right, see figure 6, first the right front wheel is braked, 
then the left wheel to curve around the obstacle. The right wheel is braked again to level 
the direction after passing the obstacle. After leveling and driving straight ahead, the 
vehicle is stopped by braking both front wheels, see figure 7. 
 
Figure 7 presents the required and actual brake pressure curves on the individual 
wheels of the front axle. It is clear from the waveforms that first the pressure on the 
right wheel is required and realized, then on the left wheel, then on the right wheel, and 
y 
x 
z (yaw rate) 
road obstacle 
Democar II 
Figure 5: Experimental vehicles; left - Democar II 4WD (drive/steer/brake-by-
wire) with own universal platform and Skoda Superb III (originally MQB 
platform) with gateway system implementation (dev-DCU) for ADAS development 
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finally both wheels are braked at the same time. The required brake pressure values are 
entered by the vehicle operator via wireless remote control. For this reason, the change 
in amplitude and the different length of the brake pressure requirements of the 
individual wheels can be seen. The actual pressure value is modulated in the form of 




Figure 7: Characteristic Brake Curves when Steering around the Obstacle 
Figure 8 presents the change in speed of the individual wheels of the front and rear 
axles. The vehicle reached a speed of 18 km / h during the test. For better 
maneuverability and function of the new tested assistance system, a higher vehicle 
speed and thus the kinetic energy of the vehicle is suitable. However, within the 
university testing and for safety reasons, the tests were performed up to a speed of 20 
km / h. For this reason, a permanent drive torque was activated on the rear axle during 
the test during the obstacle avoidance maneuver, which emulated the vehicle's higher 
kinetic energy. When driving the vehicle after the maneuver, the driving torque was 
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Figure 8: Characteristic Wheel Velocity Curves when Steering around the Obstacle 
Figure 9 presents the course of the actual values of the transverse (y-axis) and 
longitudinal (x-axis) acceleration of the vehicle. The figure shows the course of the yaw 
rate (in the z axis). The polarity of the waveforms corresponds to the polarity 
determined by the arrows of the coordinate system according to figure 6. Finally, this 
figure shows the total driving torque of the rear axle, which is positive from the 
beginning of the journey and negative only at the moment of the request to stop the 
vehicle and then zero when the vehicle is stationary. All presented acceleration, turning 
speed and total torque curves correspond to the performed test maneuver. 
 
 
Figure 9: Characteristic Curve and Yaw Rate when Steering around the Obstacle 
So far, the performed tests preliminary confirms the possibility that the proposed 
decomposition solution as depicted in 4.1 might work. Moreover, in case of the 
Democar embrace obstacle experiment, testing showed that it is possible even more 
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than to maintain the desired path up to 4 seconds. Democar is able to perform the whole 
embrace maneuver around the obstacle without the functional steering (EPS) system. 
Although the preliminary results are promising, we need to perform many more 
experiments to be able to prove the whole concept. For example, to list a few, we need 
to test the accuracy of the steering for different speeds, test the maneuver on low friction 
surface, test the maximum possible steering power resistance, test the steering 
possibility on real car.  
5 Outlook and Summary 
The research work presented in this article shows that by decomposition of ECUs 
(Electronic Control Units) at vehicle level it is possible to achieve a situation where in 
complex situations (e.g., lateral control such as steering) it is possible to use an older 
platform like MQB and decompose the steering case between the ESP (Electronic 
Stability Program) and the Steering Control Unit EPS (Electric Power Steering). The 
steering function by the ESP would take over the steering from the EPS until the driver 
takes over. In our experiment the system steered in a stable manner for longer than 6 
seconds which is the time limit described in the UNECE guidelines for a HAD 3 level 
vehicle [UNECE 2020]. 
Why is this result important? In modern high-priced cars, each ECU is developed 
fault-operational which leads to very expensive solutions (e.g., four times faults 
considered per ECU) while the decomposition in the demo car combined two ASIL D 
ECUs which are complementary, ESP and EPS, and are already resent in the platform. 
This approach would allow e.g., to refine the existing MQB platform from Volkswagen 
to be able to fulfill HAD 2/3 fail-safe and fail-operational requirements in a cost-
effective way. More experiments using the classical MQB platform and following the 
vehicle decomposition approach described in the paper are currently being planned and 
performed. 
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